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Abstract
Recent developments make the possibility of achieving scalable quantum networks and quan-
tum devices closer. From the computational point of view these emerging technologies become
relevant when they are no longer classically simulatable. Hence a pressing challenge is the con-
struction of practical methods to verify the correctness of the outcome produced by universal or
non-universal quantum devices. A promising approach that has been extensively explored is the
scheme of verification via encryption through blind quantum computing initiated by Fitzsimons
and Kashefi. We present here a new construction that simplifies the required resources for any
such verifiable blind quantum computing protocol. We obtain an overhead that is linear in the
size of the input, while the security parameter remains independent of the size of the computa-
tion and can be made exponentially small. Furthermore our construction is generic and could
be applied to any non-universal scheme with a given underlying graph.
1 Introduction
It is widely believed that quantum computers and generally quantum devices, can outperform their
classical counterparts. In particular, there are problems that it is believed a quantum computer
could solve efficiently, while a classical computer would require exponentially (in the size of the in-
put) long time. In general, it is not possible to classically simulate such computations and therefore
in order to verify that a generic quantum device functions correctly, we need to resort to different
techniques. Currently the most efficient ways to verify a quantum computation, is to employ cryp-
tographic methods, where we have an almost classical verifier that executes the computation using
an untrusted but fully quantum prover. There has been a number of such verification methods
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] where generally there exists a trade-off between
the practicality of the scheme versus their generality, trust assumptions and security level. It is
the target of this work to both reduce the experimental requirements of the most general schemes
and to achieve further improvements in the more restricted schemes. In order to make quantum
verification schemes practical number of aspects can be considered:
• whether the verifier’s devices are trusted or not;
• which are the verifier’s quantum technological requirements;
• is the scheme suitable for any universal computation or for only a restricted class;
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• is the output of the quantum computation classical or quantum;
• does the protocol tolerates errors due to noise;
• how does the probability of failure scale;
• which is the classical and quantum overhead and which is the round complexity of the scheme;
• whether the quantum communication needs to be done during the computation (online) or
can it be done at some earlier stage (offline);
A full review of all necessary parameters are beyond the scope of this paper but it is worth noticing
that all the above aspects have been addressed using protocols based on verification via blind
quantum computing [1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12]. We will refer to this family of protocols collectively
as VBQC schemes where the key idea is based on hiding the underlying computation (also known
as blindness). This would allow the verifier to encode simple trap computations within a general
computation that runs on a remote device in such a way that the computation is not affected, while
revealing no information to the device. The correctness of the general computation is then tested
via the verification of the trap computation. The latter is significantly less costly and thus leads
to an efficient scheme (essentially similar to an error detection code). What makes the procedure
work is the blindness that hides the trap computation from the actual one. To elaborate further
on the security parameter scaling, consider the following informal definition of verification that we
formalise later (for details see also [1]).
Definition 1. A quantum computation protocol is -verifiable if the probability of accepting an
incorrect output (classical or quantum) for any choice of the prover’s strategy is bounded by .
In a practical scenario, to be convinced of the correctness of the output obtained from a given
quantum device, one needs a verification protocol where the security parameter () can be made
arbitrarily small while keeping the cost (in terms of the experimental requirements) optimal. The
standard technique for amplification when dealing with classical output is to simply repeat the
protocol multiple times (let say d) and if all rounds are accepted and result in the same outputs,
then this output is the correct except with probability d. However, dealing with quantum output
requires more elaborate methods (to deal with the possibility of coherent attacks) that involves
the use of full fault-tolerant computation and the presence of multiple traps in order to achieve
exponential bounds.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this work we focus to further improve the underlying resource construction required for VBQC
schemes. Our main results can be summarised as follows:
1. In Section 2, inspired by the dotted-complete graph state introduced in [1], we give a generic
construction where for any given (universal or non-universal graph state resource) multiple
trap qubits isolated from the computation qubits can be added. Unlike the dotted-complete
graph state the overhead of the new construction is only linear in the size of the specific
computation that will be performed. Furthermore the traps are uniformly distributed and
their positions are essentially independent from each other.
2. We use this construction to obtain a new universal VBQC protocol (Section 3) that has
lower cost. Since we are using a different resource, the proof technique had to be accordingly
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adapted. Our protocol before embedding any boosting mechanism will already have a constant
security parameter and thus allows a potentially straightforward one-shot experiment.
3. When the output of the quantum computation is classical, we use a repetition technique
to boost the security of our protocol to arbitrarily small  (Section 4.1). Importantly, we
can achieve this using a constant number of repetitions that is independent of the size of
the computation. In previous VBQC protocols the number of repetitions that were required
increased with the size of the computation.
4. For the general quantum output case, we use a fault-tolerant encoding of the computation
and this boosts the security to arbitrary small  while in the same time we still require only
linear, in the size of the computation, overhead (Section 4.2). The overhead of most of previous
VBQC protocols are quadratic in the size of the computation with the only exception of [4].
Our generic construction could be explored to optimise various other existing VBQC and we
briefly comment on that in Section 5.
1.2 Related works
There has been a number of papers on verification addressing different aspects. With no aim to
give a complete list we give here a brief description of some related works. Aharonov, Ben-Or and
Eban [2] provided the first verification protocol. It requires a linear overhead in the size of the
computation, but also requires a verifier that has involved quantum abilities, and in particular that
can prepare entangled states of size that depends on the security parameter.
Following another approach, based on measurement-based quantum computation, Fitzsimons
and Kashefi [1] obtained the most optimal scheme from the point of view of verifiers capability.
However, the overhead of the full scheme becomes quadratic. Recently a solution for addressing this
issue was proposed in [4] by combining the above two protocols [1] and [2] in order to construct a
hybrid scheme. This was the only verification protocol (before our work) that requires linear number
of qubits while in the same time requires that the verifier has the minimal quantum property of
preparing single quantum systems. However, the protocol requires the preparation of qudits (rather
than qubits) where the dimension is dictated by the desired level of security. Moreover the required
resource is still constructed based upon the dotted-complete graph state though of small constant
size. Hence further investigation is required for establishing the experimental simplicity of the two
schemes, ours and the one in [4].
The first experimental implementation of a simplified verification protocol was presented in [3]
where a repetition technique was explored as well. Other experiments on verifiable protocols include
[16] and an experiment based on the protocol in [14]. However, none of these works are applicable
to a full universal scheme like ours.
On the other hand to achieve a classical verifier new techniques are proposed at the cost of
increasing the overall overhead of the protocol dramatically [8] or increasing the number of the
provers [9]. Other device-independent protocols [10, 11] used a single universal quantum prover
and an untrusted qubit measuring device and while the complexity improved it is still far from
experimentally realisable.
The VBQC protocol could be generally viewed as prepare and send scheme (using the termi-
nology from QKD). Equivalent schemes based on measurement-only could also be obtained [6, 7].
In this scenario the prover prepares a universal resource and sends it qubit-by-qubit to the ver-
ifier that performs different measurements in order to complete a quantum computation. These
protocols are referred to as online protocols (in contrast to the offline protocols mentioned above)
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since the quantum operations of the verifier occur when they know what they wants to compute.
The online scheme can also achieve verification either by creating traps [6], or by measuring the
stabiliser of the resource state [7]. These protocols could be improved using our techniques as we
will comment in Section 5.
Finally a composable definition of [1] is given in [12], while a limited computational model (one-
pure-qubit) is examined in [5]. Due to the generic nature of our construction these results would
be applicable to our protocol as well.
The verification protocols in [13, 17] are teleportation based. However, due to the existence of a
general mapping between the teleportation (with two qubits measurement) and one-way computing
(with one qubit measurement), see details in [18, 19], one should be able to explore any possible
improvement that our techniques could bring to these protocols, i.e. extending them to a fault-
tolerant setting with quantum outputs.
1.3 Background
The family of VBQC protocols are conveniently presented in the measurement-based quantum
computation (MBQC) model [20] that is known to be the same as any gate teleportation model
[21]. We will assume that the reader is familiar with this model (also known as the one-way model),
whereas further details can be found in [19]. The general idea behind an MBQC protocol is that one
starts with a large and highly entangled multiparty state (the resource state) and the computation
is performed by carrying out single-qubit measurements. There is a (partial) order on the measure-
ments since the basis of a measurement could depend on the outcomes of previous measurements.
The resource states used are known as graph states as they could be fully determined by a given
graph see details in [22]. One physical way to construct a graph state given the graph description
is to assign to each vertex of the graph a qubit initially prepared in the state |+〉 and for each edge
of the graph to perform a controlled-Z gate to the two adjacent vertices.
If one starts with a graph state that the qubits were prepared in a rotated basis |+θ〉 =
1/
√
2(|0〉 + eiθ |1〉) instead, then it is possible to perform the same computation with the non-
rotated graph state by preforming measurements in a similarly rotated basis. This observation led
to the formulation of the universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) protocol [23]. Here a client
prepares rotated qubits, where the rotation is only known to them. Client sends the qubits to the
server (as soon as they are prepared hence there is no need for any quantum memory). Finally the
client instructs the server to perform entangling operations according to the graph and perform
single qubits measurements in suitable angles and order to perform the desired computation. Dur-
ing this protocol the client receives the intermediate outcomes of previous measurements allowing
them to classically evaluate the next measurement angle. Due to the unknown rotation the server
does not learn what computation they actually perform.
The UBQC protocol could be turned into a verification protocol where the client (referred to
now as verifier) could detect a cheating server (referred to now as prover). To do so, the verifier for
certain vertices (called dummies) sends states from the set {|0〉 , |1〉} which has the same effect as
a Z-basis measurement on that vertex. In any graph state if a vertex is measured in the Z-basis
it results in a new graph where that vertex and all its adjacent edges are removed. During the
protocol the prover does not know for a particular vertex if the verifier send a dummy qubit or
not. This enables the verifier to isolate some qubits (disentangled from the rest of the graph) and
those qubits have fixed deterministic outcomes if the prover followed honestly the instructions. The
positions of those isolated qubits are unknown to the prover and the verifier uses them as traps
to test that the prover performs the quantum operations that is given. This technique resulted in
the first universal VBQC protocol [1] which is the basis of our paper. As we explain later, while
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the trapification idea is straightforward however it is challenging to find the most optimal way of
inserting trap qubits while not breaking the general computation. This is the central focus of this
paper to introduce a general optimised scheme for constructing graph state resources for VBQC
protocols.
2 The dotted triple-graph construction
Our construction starts with a “base” graph G such that the related graph state |G〉 can be used
as the resource to perform a particular (or universal) quantum computation in MBQC. This graph
is then “decorated” in a suitable way, resulting to a graph that we will call dotted triple-graph
DT (G). This new graph leads to a suitable resource state |DT (G)〉 for running a verified quantum
computation in an efficient way. The general idea is to construct the DT (G) graph which after
some operations (chosen secretly by the verifier) can be broken to three identical graphs. The one
will be used to perform the desired computation and the other two to insert trap computations to
detect possible deviations. The way that the DT (G) is broken is chosen by the verifier and thus the
prover is blind about which vertex belongs to which graph. This general idea was first introduced
in [1]. The key difference of our construction is that while in [1] the breaking to subgraphs occurs
in a global way, in our construction it happens locally. This difference results in a reduction on
the number of vertices (and thus qubits) that are required. The precise meaning of “locality” will
become apparent later after we introduce our construction.
In this section we will only give definitions and properties of the dotted triple-graph construction
when viewed purely as graph operations. Those properties will play a crucial role in the next sections
where we will use as resource state the dotted triple-graph state |DT (G)〉 in order to obtain verifiable
quantum computation protocols. Before going to the construction we give a definition:
Definition 2. We define the dotting operator D on graph G to be the operator which transforms
a graph G to a new graph denoted as D(G) and called dotted graph, by replacing every edge in G
with a new vertex connected to the two vertices originally joined by that edge. We call the set of
vertices of D(G) previously inherited from G as primary vertices P (D(G)), and the vertices added
by the D operation as added vertices denoted by A(D(G)).
Dotted triple-graph construction:
1. We are given a base graph G that has vertices v ∈ V (G) and edges e ∈ E(G), as in Figure 1
(a). In the following steps we will give the new graph DT (G), called dotted-triple graph and
specify its vertices and edges.
2. For each vertex vi, we define a set of three new vertices Pvi = {pvi1 , pvi3 , pvi3 }.
3. Corresponding to each edge e(vi, vj) ∈ E(G) of the base graph that connects the base vertices
vi and vj , we introduce a set of nine edges Ee(vi,vj) that connect each of the vertices in the
set Pvi with each of the vertices in the set Pvj .
4. The graph that its vertices are ∪vi∈V (G)Pvi and the edges are defined as in the previous step
is called triple-graph T (G), as in Figure 1 (b).
5. We perform the dotting operator D on the triple graph T (G) to obtain the dotted triple-graph
DT (G). An example of dotted triple-graph can be seen in Figure 1 (c).
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Figure 1: (a) A base graph consisting of three vertices and two edges. (b) A triple-graph T (G) where
for each vertex v there is a set of three vertices Pv. (c) A dotted triple-graph. For each edge of
the base graph there is a set of nine added vertices Ae. The added vertices are denoted as squares,
while the primary as circles.
Note that, according to Definition 2 and the labeling in the above construction the primary ver-
tices are given as P (DT (G)) = ∪viPvi . For convenience we also label the added vertices A(DT (G))
as follows. Corresponding to each edge e(vi, vj) of the base graph G, there are now 9 added vertices
and we will denote each set of added vertices as Aeij = {aeij1 , · · · , aeij9 }. Note that the number
of vertices of the new graph is |V (DT (G))| = 3|V (G)| + 9|E(G)|. If the maximum degree of the
base graph is a constant c then the number of vertices of the DT (G) are linear in the number of
vertices of the base graph. This property means that if we can base our verifiable quantum com-
putation protocol on this graph, then the number of qubits we will need is linear in the size of the
computation.
Having defined the dotted triple-graph construction, we give some definitions before we prove
certain properties of the DT (G). Note that in what follows we present a coloring scheme that is not
in effect a graph coloring of the DT (G). The next definition is essentially a labeling scheme that
for convenience we present it as a coloring. Therefore connected vertices could get the same color.
Definition 3 (Trap-Colouring). We define trap-colouring to be an assignment of one colour to
each of the vertices of the dotted triple-graph that is consistent with the following conditions.
(i) Primary vertices are coloured in one of the three colours white, black or green.
(ii) Added vertices are coloured in one of the four colours white, black, green or red.
(iii) In each primary set Pv there is exactly one vertex of each colour.
(iv) Colouring the primary vertices fixes the colours of the added vertices: Added vertices that
connect primary vertices of different colour are red. Added vertices that connect primary
vertices of the same colour get that colour.
Note that the choice of colours for each of the primary sets Pv can be chosen randomly and
is independent from the choices made on other primary sets. We can also see that in each of the
added sets Ae we have one white, one black, one green and six red vertices.
In Figure 2 (a) and (b) we see an example of trap-colouring, where in (a) we choose independently
the colour choices of primary vertices and in (b) the colours of added vertices is fixed following the
rules for trap-colouring given above. Before proving the next property we present a graph operation
(also introduced in [1]).
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Figure 2: (a) A dotted triple-graph, where only the primary vertices are coloured, and this is done
randomly for each set. (b) A trap-colouring of DT (G) that is fully fixed from the colouring of the
primary vertices. (c) DT (G) after performing break operations on all red vertices. This results to
three copies of the dotted base graph. (d) DT (G) after performing further break operations on the
primary vertices of the black graph and added vertices of the white graph. The result is a dotted
base graph (green) and isolated white traps on primary vertices and black traps on added vertices.
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Definition 4. We define the break operator on a vertex v of a graph G to be the operator which
removes vertex v and any adjacent edges to v from G.
Lemma 1. Given the dotted triple-graph DT (G) and a trap-colouring, by performing break oper-
ations on the red vertices we obtain three identical copies of the dotted base graph D(G) each of
them consisting of a single colour.
Proof. First we note that after the break operations on red added vertices, all the vertices of different
colours are disconnected. This follows since edges connecting different colour primary vertices were
coloured by definition red, while all added vertices that were not red are connected with same colour
vertices. Then, we need to show that the graph of each colour results to a graph identical to D(G).
To see this note that for each vertex vi of the base graph, there is a white (black, green) vertex in
Pvi . Then for each edge e(vi, vj) of the base graph G, there is a unique white (black, green) added
vertex in Aeij that joins the white vertex p
vi
w ∈ Pvi and the white vertex pvjw ∈ Pvj (and similarly
for black and green).
Figure 2 (c) illustrates how the DT (G) breaks to three identical dotted base graph, after per-
forming break operations on the red vertices.
Definition 5. We define the base-location of a vertex f ∈ V (DT (G)) of the dotted triple-graph to
be the position that the set Pv or Ae that includes f has in the dotted base graph D(G). This position
is denoted by either “v” corresponding to the primary vertex of D(G) or with “e” corresponding to
the added vertex of D(G) on the edge e.
Given a trap-colouring, each primary vertex belongs to one of the three graphs where the colour
is determined by the trap-colouring. However, its base-location is fixed prior to the trap-colouring.
Here we can see the difference of our construction with that of [1]. There a dotted-complete graph
was used and the graph also broke to three identical graphs, where all primary vertices belonged to
one of these graphs. However, there was no restriction of how this break happens, and any choice
of three equal subsets was valid. In our construction we maintain the structure of the base-location
(reducing the number of added vertices required), but in the same time the colour choices at one
primary base-location are totally independent from colour choices at other primary base-location.
The next property that was essentially proved in [1], is also required for the verification protocols
presented in the next sections.
Lemma 2. Given a dotted graph D(G), by applying break operators to every vertex in P (D(G)) or
A(D(G)) the resulting graph is composed of the vertices of A(D(G)) or P (D(G)) respectively and
contains no edges.
Proof. As the dotting operation only introduces vertices connected to vertices in P (D(G)), every
vertex in A(D(G)) shares edges only with vertices in P (D(G)). Thus when the vertices in P (D(G))
and their associated edges are removed by the break operators, the vertices in A(D(G)) become
disconnected. Similarly, since the dotting operation removes all edges between vertices in P (D(G)),
hence every vertex in P (D(G)) shares edges only with vertices in A(D(G)). Thus when the vertices
in A(D(G)) and their associated edges are removed by the break operators, the vertices in P (D(G))
become disconnected.
In Figure 2 (d) we see that after the break operations of Firgure 2 (c), further break operations
are performed on all white added vertices and on all black primary vertices. We end up with
a (green) copy of the dotted base graph and white isolated traps at primary vertices and black
isolated traps at added vertices.
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There are common properties that we will prove for both primary and added vertices and for
the ease of notation we will refer to either such set Pv or Ae as Fl with the convention that the
subscript l denotes the base-location of the set and when it takes value v (primary base-location)
it becomes Pv and when it takes value e (added base-location) it becomes Ae.
Next we show that while the trap-colouring is a global construction it can indeed be considered
as a local scheme. This property will be explored in our proof technique for the verification. We
formalise this notion in the next set of definitions and lemmas.
Definition 6. We define local-colouring of a set Fl to be an assignment of colours to that set that
is consistent with some global trap-colouring.
This definition captures the idea of colouring a particular set Fl corresponding to base-location
l such that it can be part of some global trap-colouring without having any further constraints from
colours of vertices at other base-locations. We can see that a local-colouring of an added set Aeij
fully determines the colours of the vertices in the two neighbouring primary base-locations Pvi , Pvj ,
while the converse is also true. A local-colouring of the two primary sets Pvi , Pvj fully determines
the colours of the added set Aeij . We can therefore see that a local-colouring of set Aeij is equivalent
with a local-colouring of the two neighboring primary base-locations Pvi , Pvj . We can also see that
a local-colouring of all primary sets Pv is compatible with a trap-colouring and fixes it uniquely.
However, if we have two general sets Fl1 , Fl2 it is not always possible to colour them both
using a local-colouring and still be able to find a global trap-colouring. An example is if we have a
primary set Pv1 and its added neighbouring set Ae1k , where a local colouring of the set Pv1 imposes
constraints on the colours of Ae1k further than those required from a local-colouring. To see this
note that an added vertex connected to a white primary vertex can be either white or red, but
can never be black. One can see that an added set Aeij can have local-colouring if there is no
constraint on the colours from the neighbouring primary sets Pvi , Pvj , but also from other added
sets Aeik , Aejk that have common neighbor sets (either Pvi or Pvj ). Here we wish to make precise
when there is a collection of base-locations that one can assign (independently) local-colourings to
all the related sets Fl and still be able to always find a global trap-colouring.
Definition 7 (Independently Colourable Locations (ICL)). Given a dotted triple-graph DT (G)
and a collection of n base-locations E with corresponding sets Fl, we call the set E independently
colourable locations if any local-colouring of the sets Fl is consistent with at least one trap-colouring.
What this definition captures is that the choice of colours within each of the sets Fl corre-
sponding to a base-location in E is independent from the choice of colours in other sets Fl′ with
base-location in E .
For each base-location l we define l = {l} if the base-location is primary and l = ND(G)(l) if
the base-location is added (i.e. in the latter case, it contains the two primary base-locations that
are adjacent to the location l).
Lemma 3. A set of n base-locations E is ICL if and only if for all pairs i, j ∈ E the sets i∩ j = ∅.
Proof. First we prove that a collection of base-locations satisfying this condition, is ICL. From
i∩ j = ∅ we can see that (i) for all primary base-locations in E no neighbouring base-location is in
E and (ii) for each added base-location, the two neighbouring primary-locations Pvi , Pvj are not in
E and neither is any other added base-location set that has neighbours either of Pvi , Pvj . In other
words, the sets of neighbours of added base-locations are disjoint. However, we already noted that a
local-colouring of an added base-location is equivalent with a local-colouring of the two neighboring
primary base-locations Pvi , Pvj . By replacing the local-colouring of added base-locations with that
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of the neighbouring primary base-locations, we reduce the local-colouring of the set E to that of
a collection of local-colourings of primary base-locations. This is ICL since by the definition of
trap-colouring no constraint is imposed between the colours of primary sets.
To prove the converse consider two locations i, j such that i ∩ j 6= ∅. Either one is primary
and the other is a neighbouring added base-location or i and j are added base-locations sharing
a common neighbour k. In the first case it is clear that the choice of colour at the primary set
(say i) imposes constraints on the colours of the added base-location j. In the second case, the
choise of colour at the added location i can determine that of the neighbour location k (for example
a white added vertex that is connected with a primary vertex fixes the colour of that vertex to
white). But then fixing the colours of the primary base-location k in its turn imposes constraints
for the other added neighbour j, and thus a local-colouring of i and j may not be consistent with
a trap-colouring.
We are now in position to prove the following property that is necessary for Section 4.2.
Theorem 1. Consider a dotted triple-graph DT (G). Consider a set S of n base-locations and
assume that the base graph G has maximum degree c. Then there exists a subset S′ ⊆ S of these
base-locations that are ICL (independent colourable locations) and it contains at least |S′| = n2c+1
locations.
Proof. The set S has n locations of the graph D(G). We want a subset of these locations S′ such
that it satisfies Lemma 3. The condition of that lemma requires that if a primary base-location vi
is included, then all its neighbouring base-locations should be excluded. The maximum number of
neighbours is given by the maximum number of added base-locations which is c. Therefore if we
include the base-location vi in the set S
′, we might need to exclude at most c other base-locations
from the set S.
To include any added base-location eij in the set S
′, Lemma 3 requires that its neighbours vi, vj
and the neighbours of its neighbours eik, ejk should be excluded. Its neighbours are 2, while the
neighbours of the neighbours are at most 2(c − 1). It follows that to include eij in the set S′ we
might need to exclude at most 2c other base-locations from the set S.
From the pigeonhole principle follows that we can find a set S′ with at least n2c+1 = |S′| base-
locations that are ICL.
3 Verifiable quantum computation
In this section we give a verifiable blind quantum computation protocol using the dotted triple-
graph construction, but otherwise, we follow similar steps with [1]. With our construction we obtain
a protocol where the probability of success is constant (independent of the size of the computation)
and we use only linear, in the size of the computation, number of qubits.
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Protocol 1 Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computation using dotted triple-graph
We assume that a standard labelling of the vertices of the dotted triple-graph DT (G) used, is
known to both the verifier and the prover. The number of qubits is at most 3N(3c+ 1) where c is
the maximum degree of the base graph G.
• Verifier’s resources
– Verifier is given a base graph G that the dotted graph state |D(G)〉 can be used to perform the
desired computation in MBQC with measurement pattern MComp.
– Verifier generates the dotted triple-graph DT (G), and selects a trap-colouring according to defi-
nition 3 which is done by choosing independently the colours for each set Pv.
– Verifier for all red vertices will send dummy qubits and thus performs break operation.
– Verifier chooses the green graph to perform the computation.
– Verifier for the white graph sends dummy qubits for all added qubits aew and thus generates white
isolated qubits one at each primary vertex set Pv. Similarly for the black graph the verifier sends
dummy qubits for the primary qubits pvb and thus generates black isolated qubits one at each added
vertex set Ae.
– The dummy qubits position set D is chosen as defined above (fixed by the trap-colouring).
– A sequence of measurement angles, φ = (φi)1≤i≤3N(3c+1) with φi ∈ A = {0, pi/4, · · · , 7pi/4},
consistent with MComp, where φi = 0 for all the trap and dummy qubits. The verifier chooses a
measurement order on the dotted base-graph D(G) that is consistent with the flow of the compu-
tation (this is known to prover). The measurements within each set Pv, Ae of DT (G) graph are
order randomly.
– 3N(3c+ 1) random variables θi with value taken uniformly at random from A.
– 3N(3c+1) random variables ri and |D| random variable di with values taken uniformly at random
from {0, 1}.
– A fixed function C(i, φi, θi, ri, s) that for each non-output qubit i computes the angle of the
measurement of qubit i to be sent to the prover.
• Initial Step
– Verifier’s move: Verifier sets all the value in s to be 0 and prepares the input qubits as
|e〉 = Xx1Z(θ1)⊗ . . .⊗XxlZ(θl) |I〉
and the remaining qubits in the following form
∀i ∈ D |di〉
∀i 6∈ D ∏j∈NG(i)∩D Zdj |+θi〉
and sends the prover all the 3N(3c + 1) qubits in the order of the labelling of the vertices of the
graph.
– Prover’s move: Prover receives 3N(3c+1) single qubits and entangles them according to DT (G).
• Step i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3N(3c+ 1)
– Verifier’s move: Verifier computes the angle δi = C(i, φi, θi, ri, s) and sends it to the prover.
– Prover’s move: Prover measures qubit i with angle δi and sends the verifier the result bi.
– Verifier’s move: Verifier sets the value of si in s to be bi + ri.
• Verification
– After obtaining the output qubits from the prover, the verifier measures the output trap qubits
with angle δt = θt + rtpi to obtain bt.
– Verifier accepts if bi = ri for all the white (primary) and black (added) trap qubits i.
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As it is evident from the protocol, the positions of the dummy qubits (i.e. those that are
{|0〉 , |1〉}) is determined by the trap-colouring. It is known that sending dummy qubits has the
same effect as making a Z measurement in MBQC which effectively breaks the graph state at this
vertex. Therefore the properties defined in Section 2 corresponding to the reduction of the DT (G)
to one dotted base graph D(G) and isolated traps (Lemmas 1 and 2) as well as the properties
concerning the independence of the colouring and thus the distribution of traps (Theorem 1), all
apply here.
Theorem 2. (correctness) If both verifier and prover follow the steps of protocol 1 then the output
is correct and the computation accepted.
Proof. If both verifier and prover follow the steps of protocol 1 then the prover essentially (when
pre-rotations are taken into account) applies the pattern MComp at the green dotted base graph
D(G), which by assumption performs the desired computation (see also theorems 1 and 3 of [1]).
Moreover, the isolated white and black qubits are measured in the correct basis and thus the verifier
receives bi = ri for the traps and accepts the computation.
Theorem 3. (Verification) Protocol 1 is
(
8
9
)
-verifiable both when the output is quantum or classical.
Proof. The proof follows closely steps of the proof of theorem 8 of ref [1] and thus here we will only
outline the steps of the proof and stress where we differ, while a more detailed proof can be found
in Appendix A.
The proof consists of five steps. In step 1 we prove that any deviation from the ideal protocol
can be expressed in terms of some Kraus operators which are then written as linear combination
of strings of Pauli matrices (denoted as σi) and the remaining of the proof is to see which of those
attacks maximise the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome.
In step 2 we note that there are some strings σi that for any choice of the secret parameters
(trap positions, angles, etc) of the verifier do not corrupt the computation and thus they do not
contribute to the probability of failure. The set of all the other strings σ (that could corrupt the
computation for some choice of parameters) will be denoted as Ei. It is clear that the prover, to
optimise the chance to get an incorrect outcome accepted, should only use attacks from the set Ei.
In this section, where we consider the simplest protocol, a single non-trivial attack could corrupt
the computation and the set Ei consists of all the attacks σ’s that have in at least one position a
non-trivial attack. However, in the next section this changes. The technique to amplify the success
probability uses fault-tolerant encoding and thus the computation is corrupted only if multiple
errors occur and this leads to different set Ei. For now we keep the description general for as long
as possible, so that it applies for the next section. After the set Ei is defined, in order to compute
an upper bound for the failure probability, we simply compute the probability of not triggering any
trap given that the attacks used are all from the set Ei. This is clearly an upper bound for the
failure probability (worse-case scenario), since in reality the fact that there exist some choices of
the secret parameters that a given σ ∈ Ei corrupts the computation does not mean that it corrupts
the computation in general. However, an upper bound  of the failure probability suffices to prove
that the protocol is -verifiable1.
In step 3 we exploit the blindness of the prover. The fact that the prover does not know the
secret parameters restricts the attacks that contribute to the bound of the failure probability we
compute to a convex combination of Pauli attacks. This is important since it eliminates “coherent”
1It is worth pointing out, that since this is a weak bound a different proof technique could result to a tighter
bound for the failure probability.
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type of attacks and resembles theorems in quantum key distribution (QKD) that reduce coherent
attacks to collective by exploiting the symmetry of the states.
In step 4 we show that the prover maximises the value of the bound of failure probability if they
perform an attack with exactly the fewest non-trivial attacks that are consistent with Ei obtained
from step 2. This is a single attack for the protocol of this section (but different in Section 4.2).
Moreover, since we have a convex combination of positive numbers, the greatest value is obtained
for a single σ. In the next steps of the proof we find the maximum value of our bound for an attack
corresponding to the single optimal (for the prover) σ. Here our technique has deviated from [1] so
we will give more details later (and in Appendix A).
Finally, in step 5 we use the partition of the qubits to sets Pv and Ae. It is important to note,
that within each of those sets there is exactly one computation qubit and exactly one trap qubit.
From previous steps we know that the bound of the failure probability is highest if the prover
chooses to make a single non-trivial attack. This attack happens at a qubit that belongs to either
some set Pv or some set Ae. The probability of hitting a trap given a single set is clearly independent
from the other free parameters corresponding to this qubit (but not the probability to detect it in
general) and it goes as 1/|Pv| or 1/|Ae|. This leads us to a bound for the failure probability  = 8/9.
We now give some definitions taken from [1] in order o elaborate further on the above steps
at places we significantly differ from [1], while the full proof is given in Appendix A. The output
density operator of the protocol is Bj(ν) and is given by
Bj(ν) = TrB
(∑
b
|b+ cr〉 〈b|CνC ,bΩP((⊗B |0〉 〈0| ⊗ |Ψν,b〉 〈Ψν,b|)P†Ω†C†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
(1)
where we have the following definitions: The subscript j of the operator B, corresponds to the
strategy/deviation that the prover makes, and when j = 0 is the honest run where there is no
deviation (and thus the operator Ω = I). The index ν, collectively denotes all the random choices
made by the verifier, i.e. x, r, θ, d and the positions of the traps T (where the latter depends on the
trap-colouring of the dotted triple-graph). The b’s are the outcomes of the prover’s measurement,
(cr)i = ri for i /∈ T and (cr)t = 0 for t ∈ T , the subscript B denotes tracing-out the prover’s private
registers. CνC ,b is the Pauli operator acting on the quantum output, that maps the final outcome
to the correct one depending on the choices of random variables νC and the computation branch
b. P is the unitary corresponding to implementing honestly the protocol. Ω is the deviation of the
prover and is identity in the honest run. |Ψν,b〉 = |Mν〉⊗j |δbj〉 is the initial state send by the verifier,
that includes the quantum input and the |+θ〉 states which are jointly denoted as |Mν〉 and depend
on the random choices, and the |δ〉 registers correspond to the measurement angles (that depend
on the branch of the computation b).
The probability of failure of the protocol is when the protocol returns “Accept” but the output
is orthogonal to the honest ideal. This probability is given by
pfail =
∑
ν
p(ν) Tr(P νincorrectBj(ν)) (2)
where
P νincorrect = (I− |Ψideal〉 〈Ψideal|)⊗t∈T |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |
= P⊥ ⊗t∈T |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | (3)
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is the projection into the wrong subspace (orthogonal space to the correct ideal state) while it still
remains within the accept subspace (where the traps succeed). The prover’s attack can be written
in terms of Kraus operators such that
∑
k χ
†
kχk = I which are written in terms of strings of Pauli
as χk =
∑
i aikσi. We then follow [1] up to step 3 and obtain the expression (see Appendix A):
pfail ≤
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
∑
T
p(T )
∏
t∈T
∑
θt,rt
p(θt)p(rt)(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
 (4)
Here we denote σi|γ the single-qubit Pauli matrix corresponding to position γ of the string of Pauli
σi. From
∑
ik |aik|2 = 1 we conclude that pfail is maximised when |aik| = 0 for all i /∈ Ei. Moreover,
it is maximised if |aik| = 1 for a single σi.
pfail ≤ max
i∈Ei
∑
T
p(T )
∏
t∈T
∑
θt,rt
p(θt)p(rt)(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
 (5)
This consists of a product of non-negative terms that are less than unity only if there is a non-trivial
attack. It follows that the expression is maximum for a σi that has non-trivial terms in as few as
possible positions. This happens when σi is non-trivial for a single position β and this position
belongs to either the set Pvβ or the set Aeβ depending on whether the non-trivial attack is done on
a qubit that belongs to a primary set or an added set. The set that the attack belongs, is a property
that does not depend on the secret choices of the verifier, as for example, the trap-colouring. We
will use the notation Fβ to refer to a set that can be either Pvβ or Aeβ .
We then break p(T ) which is the probability of different trap configurations using the structure
of the subsets Pv, Ae, i.e. p(T ) = p(t1 ∈ Pv1 , t2 ∈ Pv2 , · · · , tk ∈ Ae1 , · · · ). Therefore, given a single
attack on set Fβ we can sum over all the other sets (all the other positions do not appear/have
explicit dependency in the expression) and obtain
∑
T p(T ) =
∑
tβ∈Fβ
∑
t/∈Fβ p(T ) =
∑
tβ∈Fβ p(tβ).
We obtain
pfail ≤ max
i∈Ei
∑
tβ∈Fβ
∑
θtβ ,rtβ
p(tβ)p(θtβ )p(rtβ )(〈ηνtβ |σi|tβ |ηνtβ 〉)2. (6)
It is important to note that σi|tβ is identity if β 6= tβ while it is non-trivial otherwise, therefore
(|Fβ|−1) terms of the sum will be unity, while one term will be less than one2. The above expression
depends on whether the set Fβ is output set, or in the case that is a measured set on whether it is
a primary or added set. Since the prover chooses which set to attacks the bound will be the highest
of these values. We consider separately each case (see Appendix A) and we obtain the highest pfail
when there is a single attack on an added qubit. This happens because the added sets have 9 qubits
|Ae| = 9 and the chance of missing the trap is better. Noting that added qubits are not output
qubits we thus obtain
2It turns out that the not-unity term, is zero for measured qubits, while it can be up to 1/2 for output qubits.
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pfail ≤ 1
16|Aeβ |
∑
tβ∈Aeβ
∑
θtβ ,rtβ
(〈ηνtβ |σi|tβ |ηνtβ 〉)2.
≤ 1
16|Ae|
∑
rt
(
8 · (|Aeβ | − 1) + 8 · (〈rtβ |σi|tβ |rtβ 〉)2
)
≤
(
8
9
)
(7)
4 Amplification of the probability of success
In the previous section we gave a simple construction to directly obtain a verification protocol with
constant failure probability . However, a verification protocol is successful if the  of the failure
probability can be made arbitrarily small. There are two techniques that have been used to amplify
the probability of success of a verification protocol. The first one is simpler both conceptually and
in terms of experimental requirements, but applies only in the case that the output of the quantum
computation performed is classical. The second applies for computations with quantum output as
well. We will use both techniques and show that starting with the dotted triple-graph construction
we obtain in both cases improvements.
4.1 Amplification for classical output
As we mentioned in the introduction, in the case that a quantum computation has a classical output
(e.g. solving classical problems or sampling, etc) it is sufficient to have a protocol that is -verifiable
for any  < 1. The reason is because one can boost this  and make it arbitrarily small by repeating
the protocol sufficiently many times and accepting only when all repetitions agree. This results to
an ′ = d which can be made as small as the security level required by choosing the number of
repetitions d suitably.
In a previous protocol for classical output in [1], the brickwork state was used. The brickwork
state can have a single trap and leads to an  =
(
1− 1n
)
. By employing the repetition technique
(that was used in [3]) this  can be boosted to an ′ =
(
1− 1n
)d
. However, we see that in order
to achieve a constant security level, the number of repetitions needs to increase as the size of the
computation increases. For large enough n it is easy to see, that if the single repetition requires
n qubits, to maintain a fixed security level O(n2) qubits are needed. This is not better than the
quantum-output protocol given in [1] that used a “dotted-complete graph”. It is worth noting, that
even though the complexity scales in the same way as the full “dotted-complete graph” protocol of
[1], the repetition protocol has still a number of practical advantages (it is easier to implement, has
smaller coefficient of the leading term and for simple enough computation can be experimentally
realised).
By using the dotted triple-graph construction we can obtain a repetition protocol where we only
repeat a constant number of times (and the number of repetitions depends only on the security
level). It follows, that the dotted triple-graph repetition protocol requires only a linear number of
qubits. Again, it does not give better complexity from the general protocol (that allows for quantum
output) which we give in the next section. However, it has the same practical advantages as the
repetition protocol of the brickwork state.
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Protocol 2 Boosted Verifiable UBQC using dotted triple-graph for classical output
• Verifier chooses a computation that has classical and deterministic output (e.g. a decision
problem).
• Verifier chooses a number d, where d = log log(8/9) and the desired security level is .
• For each i ∈ {1, · · · , d} Verifier follows steps of Protocol 1, with random different
choices of secret parameters. If the verifier accepts the computation, they register the
classical output as Oi and store it.
• If the verifier rejected at any single repetition of Protocol 1, they reject the overall computa-
tion. If not, they compare the classical outputs Oi and if all of them are identical, they accept
this output as the output of the computation.
Theorem 4. (Verification) Protocol 2 is
(
8
9
)d
-verifiable where the output is classical and d is the
number of repetitions.
Proof. We have multiple repetitions and if all of them return the same output O, then the probabil-
ity that this is not the correct output is bounded by the probability that all repetitions failed (and
resulted to the same deviation). Since the different repetitions have the same outcome it means
that if a single of those repetitions is successful then the output O is the correct output. From
Theorem 3 we know that the probability that a single repetition fails, is 8/9. Then the probability
that all the d repetitions fail is
(
8
9
)d
.
Alternative construction for classical output. In the case of classical output, there is an
alternative construction to the dotted triple-graph that could decrease further the (linear) overhead.
In particular, instead of having the dotted triple-graph DT (G) one could consider three copies of
the dotted base graph D(G). We will name this the three dotted copies construction. The one copy
will be used for computation, while the other two for white traps (on primary vertices) and black
traps (on added vertices). This construction is global, in the sense that the decision of which vertices
are in which graph is made from the beginning and cannot be decided independently per base graph
vertex vi. It follows that the location of the traps is totally correlated globally and there is no way
to amplify the success probability in the quantum output case. This is the reason we focused on the
dotted triple-graph construction for the quantum output case. For the classical output however,
the three dotted copies construction works.
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Protocol 3 Boosted three dotted copies Verifiable UBQC for classical output
• Verifier chooses a computation that has classical and deterministic output (e.g. a decision
problem).
• Verifier chooses a number d, where d = log log(2/3) and the desired security level is .
• For each i ∈ {1, · · · , d} Verifier follows steps of Protocol 1, using three dotted-
copies instead of dotted triple-graph and with random different choices of secret
parameters for every run. If the verifier accepts the computation, they register the classical
output as Oi and store it.
• If the verifier rejected at any single repetition of the modified Protocol 1, they reject the
overall computation. If not, they compare the classical outputs Oi and if all of them are
identical, they accept this output as the output of the computation.
Theorem 5. (Three dotted-copies Verification) Protocol 3 is
(
2
3
)d
-verifiable where the output is
classical and d is the number of repetitions.
Proof. Following the proof of Theorem 3, at step 2 in order to corrupt the computation the prover
needs to make at least one non-trivial attack. However, the prover is blind about which of the
three graphs is the computation, white and black trap graph. Therefore, it has probability 1/3 that
the attack coincides with a trap graph of the same type of the attack location (i.e. if it attacks
a primary vertex, then with probability 1/3 the attack was on a qubit that belongs in the white
graph, while if the attack was on an added vertex with probability 1/3 the attack was on a qubit
that belongs in the black graph). For classical output the non-trivial attacks are {X,Y } only (all
qubits are measured), and thus the attack is deterministically detected when it hits a trap, as
〈ηνt |σX/Y |ηνt 〉 = 〈rt|σX/Y |rt〉 = 0. Therefore the probability of failure is pfail ≤ 2/3.
To amplify this probability, we can simply repeat the protocol d times, and if all classical
outputs agree in all the runs then the probability that the computation was corrupted is bounded
by pfail ≤
(
2
3
)d
. Moreover, the number of qubits required per repetition, are 3|V (G)| + 3|E(G)| ≤
3(1+c)|V (G). Both in terms of failure probability and in terms of the (linear in both cases) number
of qubits per repetition, the three copies construction gives better result.
4.2 Amplification for quantum output
We now turn to the general case, where the output of the computation can be quantum. Our main
result is that our dotted triple-graph construction leads to an exponentially-secure verification
protocol for quantum output with only linear overhead. Similar to [1] we will use a technique that
exploits the possibility to encode the computation in a fault-tolerant way in order to amplify the
probability of success of the protocol. The particular size of the boosting achieved will depend on
the fault-tolerant code that is used. Here we treat the protocol in full generality.
The general idea is that the computation is encoded using a fault-tolerant encoding, while the
traps are still single (non-encoded) qubits. Therefore, while a single error on a trap leads to a
rejection of the computation, to corrupt the actual output of the computation many errors on
computation qubits are required. The prover needs to simultaneously avoid hitting any single trap
and in the same time hit many computation qubits in order to corrupt the output.
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Protocol 4 Boosted Verifiable UBQC for quantum output, using dotted triple-graph and Fault-
Tolerant Encoding
• Verifier chooses a base graph G and a measurement pattern MComp on the dotted base graph
D(G) that implements the desired computation in a fault-tolerant way, that can detect or
correct errors fewer than δ/2.
• Verifier follows steps of Protocol 1.
Theorem 6. (Verification) Protocol 4 is
(
8
9
)d
-verifiable for quantum or classical output, where
d = d δ2(2c+1)e, c is the maximum degree of the base graph and δ is the number of errors tolerated
on the base graph G.
Proof. We assume that there is a fault-tolerant encoding of the computation, that when done in
MBQC, corrects or detects all errors that have fewer than δ number of errors when the computation
is performed on the base graph G. Any operation on a measured qubit, diagonal in the computa-
tional basis (σi ∈ {I, Z}) does not alter the computation. Therefore errors that can contribute to
corrupting a single logical qubit, involve errors σi ∈ {X,Y } for measured qubits and σi ∈ {X,Y, Z}
for output qubits.
Considering the dotted base graph D(G), one can easily see that any (non-trivial) error on
an added qubit aeij , is equivalent with a local error on each of the two primary qubits that are
neighbours pvi , pvj (see also [1]). If to corrupt a computation one needs δ errors on primary qubits
of the base graph G, it follows that to corrupt the computation when done on the dotted base
graph D(G) one needs at least δ/2 errors on qubits of the dotted base graph D(G).
We now turn back to step 2 of the proof of theorem 3 and we see that the set Ei of attacks that
could possibly corrupt the computation, should include non-trivial attack in at least δ/2 different
sets Pv, Ae (which collectively we call Fβ). It is important to note that within each of the sets Fβ
there is a single computation-graph qubit and therefore not only the prover needs to perform δ/2
non-trivial attacks, but they should also be done on at least δ/2 different location sets. The prover
of course could choose to attack multiple qubits of the same set Fβ, but in order to hit at least δ/2
computation qubits, the sets that they perform non-trivial attacks should also be at least δ/2.
Any given attack σi is characterised by the set Si of locations on the dotted base graph D(G),
that it has at least one non-trivial attack, which in the case σi ∈ Ei it means that |Si| ≥ δ/2 .
Following step 3 and 4 of the proof of theorem 3, we reach eq. (5). From this expression we can
again see, that the fewer the positions of non-trivial attack (consistent with Ei) the greatest the
value of this bound is. We already know that we need at least δ/2 sets Fβ with non-trivial attacks,
so it follows that the maximum is achieved when there are exactly δ/2 different sets Fβ with exactly
a single attack in each.
To proceed further we need to decompose the probability of different configuration of traps
p(T ) to this of individual sets. This is not in general possible since there are correlation between
the traps of (neighbouring) sets. To this point we should note that fixing a configuration of traps
is identical with giving a trap-colouring as in definition 3.
From Theorem 1, we know that given a collection Si of δ/2 locations on the dotted base graph
D(G) there are at least a collection S′i of
δ
2(2c+1) that are independently colourable locations, i.e.
|S′i| = d δ2(2c+1)e. To obtain an upper bound on the failure probability, we set σi|γ = I for all γ that
belong to locations in Si \ S′i. This change is non-decreasing for the expression for the bound given
in eq. (5). Now the only locations that have non-trivial attacks, are those in S′i and we have
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pfail ≤ max
i∈Ei
|S′i|∏
β=1
∑
tβ∈Fβ
p(tβ)
∑
θtβ ,rtβ
p(θtβ )p(rtβ )(〈ηνtβ |σi|tβ |ηνtβ 〉)2 (8)
where we used the fact that p(T ) = p(t1 ∈ Pv1 , t2 ∈ Pv2 , · · · , tk ∈ Ae1 , · · · ) and for a collection S′i
of independent colourable locations,
∑
tβ∈S′i
∑
tβ /∈S′i
p(T )
 = ∑
tβ∈S′i
 |S′i|∏
β=1
p(tβ)
 (9)
We can see this due to the fact that after summing all locations apart from those in S′, the
probability for choosing the location of the trap within each set is independent and thus the joint
probability is simply their product. Now, each term in the product of eq. (8) is bounded by 8/9 as
proven in the previous section and therefore we obtain
pfail ≤
(
8
9
)d
(10)
where we define d = |S′i| = d δ2(2c+1)e
As a final remark, we should note that the value d = d δ2(2c+1)e is the minimum number of ICL
that exist and in particular cases this number can be greater and thus the probability of success of
the verification protocol also becomes greater for those cases.
5 Consequences for existing verification protocols
The dotted triple-graph construction can be used to improve a number of existing verification
protocols and here we give indicatively three of them. First we consider the specific case where the
computation is done using the Raussedorf-Harrington-Goyal (RHG) [24] encoding and the related
graph is GL. Following our construction instead of the dotted-complete graph of [1], we obtain the
dotted triple-RHG graph DTGL. This graph state has linear number of qubits (as the maximum
degree of the graph is 4). With the same choices of parameters as in [1], it can detect or corrects
any deviation that has fewer than δ/2 errors. From our results of the previous section, it follows
that we obtain a linear-complexity verification protocol with exponential security bound given by
pfail ≤
(
8
9
)d δ
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e
.
The second application is that it can be used to improve verifiable fault-tolerant protocols.
Assuming that there are errors due to noise (non-adversarial), the protocols given earlier in the
text and in other VBQC protocols could face a problem. In particular, honest errors due to noise
could make trap measurement to fail and lead us to reject the output even in honest runs where the
computation is not corrupted. Here we should stress that both in this paper and in [1] the use of
fault-tolerant encoding was in order to amplify the security and not to correct the computation from
errors caused by honest noise. However, one can construct a fault-tolerant verification protocol, at
least for classical output, and one such example is presented in [10]. The starting graph used to
obtain the fault-tolerant protocol of [10] was the brickwork graph that has a single trap. Then a
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fault-tolerant encoding was done followed by the repetition technique used to amplify the success
probability. However the number of repetitions to maintain a constant level of security increased
with the size of the computation. By using the dotted triple-brickwork instead, as the first step of
the construction in [10], we can achieve exponential security with a constant number of repetitions.
This would essentially bring down the number of qubits required from O(n2) to O(n).
The third application is that we can directly use the dotted triple-graph construction for the
verifiable measurement-only protocols [6, 7]. In particular [6] is essentially the online version of
[1], and the technique to include traps in the graph is equivalent. It follows that if the resource
used instead of a dotted-complete graph is a dotted triple-RHG graph then the number of qubits
required will reduce from quadratic to linear. In [7] the verifier, instead of including traps, uses
2k + 1 copies of a universal graph. In order to test the honesty of the prover it makes stabiliser
measurements to 2k copies of the desired graph while performs the computation on the final copy.
However, there is always at least a 1/(2k+1) probability that the computation is corrupted and not
detected. Using the dotted triple-graph construction, modified for the measurement-only protocols,
this probability can be made exponentially small while still using only linear number of qubits.
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A Proof of Verification
Here we give the detailed proof of Theorem 3. In some parts we follow closely the proof of Theorem
8 of [1]. The proof has five steps. In step 1 we express the attack using Kraus operators and Pauli
matrices, in step 2 we show that in order to lie in the incorrect subspace, at least one non-trivial
attack to one qubit (of the dotted triple-graph) is required, and then we will replace the projection
to the incorrect subspace with this restriction on the sum of allowed attacks. In step 3 we will
exploit the blindness of the prover to reduce the attack to Pauli attacks. In step 4 we will show
that the fewer the non-trivial attacks the greater the probability for the adversary, and thus we
will restrict to the fewer allowed attacks (a single one). Finally, in step 5 we will use a suitable
partition of the qubits which will then leads to a constant bound for the pfail.
Step 1: First we note that after tracing out the prover’s register, the unitary Ω becomes a
completely positive trace preserving map (CPTP), and can be expressed in terms of the Kraus
operators {χk}, where
∑
k χkχ
†
k = I. Moreover we express each Kraus operator as linear combination
of Pauli operators χk =
∑
i αkiσi and
∑
k,i αkiα
∗
ki = 1. The matrix σi is a tensor product of Pauli
matrices, where if we want to specify the Pauli acting on qubit γ we will denote it as σi|γ . We then
get
pfail =
∑
ν
p(ν) Tr(P νincorrectBj(ν))
=
∑
b,i,j,k
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα
∗
kj(P⊥ ⊗t∈T |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |) |b+ cr〉 〈b|
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CνC ,bσiP |Ψν,b〉 〈Ψν,b| P†σjC†νC ,b |b〉 〈b+ cr|
)
(11)
Step 2: Again following [1], we can see that only terms that satisfy
Tr(P⊥σiP |Ψν,b〉 〈Ψν,b| P†σj) 6= 0 (12)
contribute to the pfail. The terms that obey this are those necessarily within those that |Bi|+ |Ci|+
|DOi | ≥ 1, which we will denote as i ∈ Ei (and similarly j ∈ Ej), where the sets are defined as:
Ai = {γ s.t. σi|γ = I and γ qubit of the dotted triple-graph}
Bi = {γ s.t. σi|γ = X and γ qubit of the dotted triple-graph}
Ci = {γ s.t. σβ|γ = Y and γ qubit of the dotted triple-graph}
Di = {γ s.t. σβ|γ = Z and γ qubit of the dotted triple-graph} (13)
and the superscript O denotes subset of those sets that the γ is output qubit. In other words, to
corrupt the computation one either needs to flip the outcome of a measured qubit, or make any
Pauli (other than the identity) if the attack is on the quantum output.
We have now imposed that the attacks σi that contribute have at least one non-trivial Pauli
attack at a qubit of the DT(G). This is not a sufficient condition to corrupt the computation in
general (and send it to the P⊥ subspace), but is a necessary condition. To see this, we note that if
we consider a σi where i /∈ Ei, then there is no choice of the secret parameters that would bring the
state in the P⊥ subspace. Here we take the worse-case scenario, where we assume that if there is
some choice of secret parameters that a given attack could corrupt the computation, then we assume
that it already is in the subspace P⊥ and we only check what is the probability that this attack
did not triggered any trap. For protocol 1 it is a single attack that could corrupt the computation.
We then replace the projection on the P⊥ subspace, with a restriction on the possible attacks, i.e.
at the sum we only have terms corresponding to attacks that belong to the set Ei. Note, that if
the computation was encoded in an fault-tolerant way (as is done in Section 4.2), then the set Ei
requires greater number of non-trivial attacks. For now we take the more conservative view.
We then obtain the following expression:
pfail ≤
∑
k,b′
∑
ν
p(ν) Tr
(⊗t∈T |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗ |b′〉 〈b′|)
∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
P |Ψν,b′〉 〈Ψν,b′ | P†
∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
†
(14)
where b′ = {bi}i/∈T a substring of b that excludes the value for the trap measurements (and we used
that 〈ηνTt | |bt〉 = δηνTt ,bt).
Step 3: The next step is to exploit the fact that summing over the secret parameters of the verifier
result to the prover being blind, and show that the only attacks that contribute are Pauli attacks,
i.e. attacks that σi|γ = σj|γ for all γ. Summing over νC we obtain
pfail =
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
αikα
∗
jkp(νT ) Tr
(
⊗t∈T |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |σi
(
⊗t∈T |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt | ⊗t∈T |δt〉 〈δt| ⊗
I
Tr(I)
)
σj
)
(15)
As all Pauli matrices but the identity are traceless, all terms in the sum are zero unless σi|γ = σj|γ
apart from the case that γ ∈ T . Then we use the fact that ∑θt,rt Tr(〈ηνTt |σi |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |σj |ηνTt 〉) = 0
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unless σi|t = σj|t in the case that t ∈ O and that for measured traps it suffices to sum over rt, i.e.∑
rt
Tr(〈ηνTt |σi |ηνTt 〉 〈ηνTt |σj |ηνTt 〉) = 0 unless σi|t = σj|t. We then conclude that only terms that
contribute are those that σi = σj . We thus obtain:
pfail ≤
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2
∑
T
p(T )
∏
t∈T
∑
θt,rt
p(θt)p(rt)(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
 (16)
where we broke the sum of νT to the choice of positions T , and the random choices of θt, rt, and
we have taken the product of all those terms corresponding to the various white and black traps.
Step 4: In this step, we will prove that to maximise the value of the bound of the probability of
pfail, the best strategy is to do the fewer number of attacks allowed by the constraint obtained at
step 2, which in our case, is a single attack. Then at the next step we will bound this maximum
value. We have
pfail ≤
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki|2f(i) (17)
where f(i) :=
∑
T p(T )
∏
t∈T
(∑
θt,rt
p(θt)p(rt)(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
)
. From
∑
ik |aik|2 = 1 we conclude
that pfail is maximised when |aik| = 0 for all i /∈ Ei. Then we have a convex combination of values
f(i). Let f(m) = maxi∈Ei f(i), then and it follows that if this is maximum for the single value m,
then by choosing |aik| = 0 for all i 6= m the bound for pfail is maximised.
pincorrect ≤ f(m) = max
i∈Ei
f(i)
≤ max
i∈Ei
∑
T
p(T )
∏
t∈T
∑
θt,rt
p(θt)p(rt)(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
 (18)
In other words, we obtain a bound by considering a single σi that belongs to the set Ei and
maximises the expression we have. The following expression involves a product of positive numbers,
that are all less or equal to unity:
∏
t∈T
∑
θt,rt
p(θt)p(rt)(〈ηνTt |σi|t |ηνTt 〉)2
 (19)
In particular we can see that the terms in the product of eq. (19) are unity for all trap positions
that σi|t is trivial, i.e. σi|k /∈ {X,Y } if k is not output, or σi|k /∈ {X,Y, Z} if k is an output qubit.
It is clear that this expression is bigger the more terms containing trivial attacks on traps. In other
words, if we have two possible attacks σi and σi′ , where for all γ that σi|γ is non-trivial it is equal to
σi′|γ (but there are γ that σi′|γ is non-trivial while σi|γ is trivial), then f(i) ≥ f(i′). Therefore the
term that maximises pfail corresponds to an attack σi that has the fewest (possible, i.e. compatible
with Ei) non-trivial terms.
From step 2 we obtained that the set Ei has at least one non-trivial Pauli attack, so it follows that
the bound of the pfail we compute is maximised when there is exactly one non-trivial Pauli attack.
It is important to note however, that the set Ei will be different in Section 4.2 where we consider
22
fault-tolerant encoding of the computation and the corresponding σi will involve greater number of
non-trivial attacks. In that case, the set of attacks that can possibly corrupt the computation (and
thus send it to P⊥ subspace) changes (i.e. Ei differs).
Step 5: We will now use the partition of the qubits of the dotted triple-graph, to the subsets Pv, Ae
corresponding to vertices and edges of the base graph. The way that this partition is chosen does
not reveal any new information to the prover and does not depend on the choice of trap-colouring,
i.e. on the positions of the traps.
We have established that the optimal strategy for the prover in order to maximise the value of
the bound for the pfail we compute, is to make a single non-trivial attack at one qubit of the dotted
triple-graph. Let us assume that this single position is β and we know that it belongs to either a
set Pvβ or a set Aeβ depending on whether the non-trivial attack is done on a qubit belonging to a
primary set Pvβ or an added set Aeβ . When it is not clear if the set is primary or added, we will
use Fβ which simply means that Fβ = Pvβ if β is at a primary location and Fβ = Aeβ if β is at an
added location.
We then break the p(T ) which is the probability of different trap configurations, using the
structure of the subsets Pv, Ae, i.e. p(T ) = p(t1 ∈ Pv1 , t2 ∈ Pv2 , · · · , tk ∈ Ae1 , · · · ). Therefore, given
a single attack at set Fβ, we can sum over all the other sets (all the other positions do not appear in
the remaining expression) and obtain
∑
T p(T ) =
∑
tβ∈Fβ
∑
t/∈Fβ p(T ) =
∑
tβ∈Fβ p(tβ). We obtain
pfail ≤ max
i∈Ei
∑
tβ∈Fβ
∑
θtβ ,rtβ
p(tβ)p(θtβ )p(rtβ )(〈ηνtβ |σi|tβ |ηνtβ 〉)2. (20)
It is important to note that σi|tβ is identity if β 6= tβ while it is non-trivial otherwise, therefore
(|Fβ|−1) terms of the sum will be unity, while one term will be less than one3. The above expression
depends on whether the set Fβ is output set, or in the case that is a measured set one on whether
it is a primary or added set. It will be the prover that chooses which is the set of the attack, and
thus the bound will be the highest of these values. We consider separately each case. We define the
quantity
g(i, Fβ) =
∑
tβ∈Ftβ
∑
θtβ ,rtβ
p(tβ)p(θtβ )p(rtβ )(〈ηνtβ |σi|tβ |ηνtβ 〉)2 (21)
where the function g has explicit the dependence on which set Fβ does the non-trivial attack belong
to. In particular, we will denote POvβ if the non-trivial attack is on an output set (note that output
qubits are only primary), and Pvβ′ if it is on a measured primary set and Aeβ′ if it is on a measured
added set. We will separately compute the maximum of g(i, POvβ ), g(i, Pvβ′ ), g(i, Aeβ′ ) for i ∈ Ei and
the bound will be the maximum of those three.
We start with the output qubits
g(i, POvβ ) =
1
16|POvβ |
∑
tβ∈POvβ
∑
θt,rt
(〈+θ|σi|tβ |+θ〉)2
=
1
16× 3
∑
θt,rt
(
1 · (|POvβ | − 1) + 1 · (〈+θ|σi|tβ |+θ〉)2
)
3It turns out that the not-unity term, is zero for measured qubits, while it can be up to 1/2 for output qubits.
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≤ 1
16× 3
(
16 · (|POvβ | − 1) + 8
)
≤
(
1− 1
2|POvβ |
)
=
5
6
(22)
where we used that
∑
θ(〈+θ|σ |+θ〉)2 ≤ 4 for σ 6= I and that |POvβ | = 3 since output qubits are
primary.
Now we consider the measured qubits similarly (using Fβ′ to denote either primary or added
measured set), to obtain
g(i, Fβ′) =
1
16|Fβ′ |
∑
tβ∈Fβ′
∑
θt,rt
(〈rtβ |σi|tβ |rtβ 〉)2
=
1
16|Fβ′ |
∑
rt
(
8 · (|Fβ′ | − 1) + 8 · (〈rtβ |σi|tβ |rtβ 〉)2
)
=
1
16|Fβ′ |
(
16 · (|Fβ′ | − 1)
)
=
(
1− 1|Fβ′ |
)
≤ 8
9
(23)
where the last step the equality holds if the attack is on added qubits where |Fβ′ | = |Aeβ′ | = 9. For
primary measured sets Pvβ′ the bound is only (2/3) and thus is lower. It follows that the overall
bound we obtain (worse-case) is
pfail ≤
(
8
9
)
(24)
Since this bound is obtained when the attack is on a measured (added) qubit, the bound is the
same when the output is fully classical.
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